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Introduction
The Institute for Formal Ontology and Medical
Information Science, IFOMIS (http://ifomis.de)a t
the University of Leipzig, is developing a common
reference ontology for the medical domain. This
ontology will be developed in tandem with work on
ontology formalization being carried out at the Uni-
versities of Leeds (http://www.comp.leeds.ac.uk/
brandon/ontology/) and Trento and Rome (http://
ontology.ip.rm.cnr.it/) and elsewhere. It will also
provide part of the ontological infrastructure for
the systems for the extraction of digitalized infor-
mation content from unstructured medical text that
are being developed in Belgium by the company
Language and Communication NV (http://www.
landc.be).
Whilst the technology for running databases has
reached an impressive state of maturity, the classiﬁ-
cation systems upon which this technology is based
are the products of myriad ad hoc decisions stretch-
ing back to the early days of database design. The
resulting inadequacies become apparent, for exam-
ple, wherever attempts are made to integrate data
from different sources. The problems remind one
of the old fable of the Tower of Babel.
A central classiﬁcation system designed to facili-
tate database integration was called by information
scientists an ‘ontology’. At IFOMIS we assume
that the 2000 year-old philosophical discipline that
is traditionally called ‘ontology’ is vital for the
kind of ontology information scientists are develop-
ing. Since Aristotle’s day, philosophers have been
working on many of the problems that underlie
the problems ontological engineers are working
on. Examples of such problems concern universals
and particulars, properties and relations, events and
processes. At IFOMIS we assume that for build-
ing ontologies we need true philosophical theories
about reality, rather than just representations of
concepts or beliefs. My purpose here is to illustrate
this claim by explaining how a philosophical theory
of causation may help in ontological engineering.
Philosophical theories of causation
In philosophy, two questions about causation are
discussed (although they are not always distin-
guished). The ﬁrst is what we may call the semantic
question: can statements of the form ‘A caused B’
be transformed into statements of some other type?
In particular, can they be transformed into state-
ments that do not contain any reference to a cause
or causes. The second is what we may call the onto-
logical question: what is there in reality that makes
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true a claim that something causes something else?
What in reality do we refer to in causal claims? I
shall now brieﬂy sketch some standard philosoph-
ical theories of causation and relate them to these
questions. Then I shall describe the theory I favour
and indicate how that theory may be relevant to the
task of the ontological engineer.
Most contemporary philosophical work on cau-
sation still pays homage to David Hume’s ideas.
Hume considers one billiard ball pushing against
another and says that we can observe the move-
ment of the ﬁrst ball and the subsequent movement
of the second ball, but we cannot observe any push-
ing necessitating, or bringing about — in short, any
causal connexion — between the two movements.
Since he thought that every concept must be a copy
of a sense impression or a complex of such copies,
Hume concluded that the concept of causation does
not contain the idea of a causal connexion [6]. Con-
temporary Humean philosophers draw the further
conclusion that there is no such thing as a causal
connexion. One theory of causation in this spirit
is the regularity theory, which deﬁnes causation
as follows:
A caused B if and only if (1) A preceded B, and (2) events
like A are always followed by events like B.
The resulting picture is that what happens at one
time does not really have an impact on what
happens later. Nothing really brings anything else
about. When we call something a cause we just
represent it in relation to what happens in other
similar situations; we subsume it under obtaining
patterns or regularities of the form: such-and-
such events are always followed by such-and-
such events.
This view poses obvious difﬁculties [7], e.g. a
pattern of the given type is instantiated whenever
the falling of a barometer is followed by rain, but
the falling of a barometer does not cause rain.
Many modiﬁcations of the regularity theory have
been proposed to meet such objections. Some more
sophisticated versions of the regularity theory,
probabilistic theories, deﬁne causation in terms of
relative frequencies: A causes B if and only if the
frequency of events like B occurring subsequent to
events like A is higher than the frequency of events
like B occurring where no event like A occurs (i.e.
A causes B if and only if P(B|A)>P(B|not-A) [1].
Another strategy Humeans have chosen to meet
the objections that the simple regularity theory
faces is to refer to regularities, not just in the
actual world, but ‘in all possible worlds’. The
counterfactual analysis of causation put forward by
David Lewis [2] says, in this sense, that A caused
B if and only if (1) A occurred and B occurred, and
(2) had A not occurred, B would not have occurred.
Regularity theories may have some plausibility
if they are taken as just claiming that causal state-
ments can be replaced by certain other statements
in which no reference to causal connexions is made.
One may hold that ‘A caused B’, at least for cer-
tain purposes, can be replaced by ‘A as well as
B occurred, and all events like A are followed by
events like B’. But if there were no causal con-
nexions, then probably there would not be any
of the regularities to which the regularity theory
refers, and probably there would not be the truths
of the type ‘Had A not occurred, B would not have
occurred’, which the counterfactual analysis uses.
The answer to the semantic question of causation
may be Humean even though the answer to the
ontological question is non-Humean.
The Tendency Theory of Causation
The Tendency Theory of Causation assumes that
there are causal connexions and gives an ontolog-
ical analysis thereof. Consider forces in Newto-
nian physics. If a gravitational force is acting on
a planet, then that planet will move in accordance
with that force if and only if there are no other
forces acting on the planet. A force is an example
of what I call a tendency. A tendency is a bias in
the world at a certain time to carry on in a certain
way. Forces are a kind of tendency, viz. tendencies
that concern the spatial position of things.
A tendency obtains at a time t1 and is a tendency
towards the world carrying on after t1 in a way that
leads to the obtaining of a certain state of affairs, S,
at a certain later time t2. The tendency is towards S.
To say that the tendency was realized is to say that
things carried on in accordance with the tendency
and that this led to S. A tendency will be realized
if and only if there is no counteracting tendency.
Some features of the world at t1 are relevant for
the tendency and others are not, e.g. if there is
a tendency towards two planets being at certain
positions at t2, then the colour of the planets or the
density of some remote star is not relevant for this
tendency. The state of affairs at t1 that is relevant
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for the obtaining of the tendency, I call the basis of
the tendency, e.g. where the law of gravity applies,
the basis of the tendency in question is referred to
in the expression: m1m2/d2.
We can now say what causation is:
A caused B if and only if A was the basis of a tendency
towards B and the tendency was realized.
This theory is an answer to the ontological question
about causation: it describes what it is in reality that
makes causal statements true.
An example
Let me illustrate this theory with an example. A
pathologist discovers that Jones’s death was caused
by morphia in his blood. We identify the cause
more precisely in three steps. First, we have to
ﬁnd out what concrete thing or stuff was involved
in the causing. It was not the kidney, not the
muscles, but the blood. Second, not every aspect
of the blood was involved in the causing. Its
consistency, the concentration of red blood cells,
etc., were not relevant for the causing. Rather,
it was the blood’s containing morphia that was
relevant. Third, in order to identify the cause
completely, we have to identify the time, t1 (period
or instant), of the operation of the cause. So the
complete identiﬁcation of a cause consists of the
identiﬁcation of the causing thing, the relevant
aspect of the thing, and the time of the causing.
What we have identiﬁed in this way we can call a
‘state of affairs’ (we can also use the term ‘event’).
This state of affairs was the basis of a certain
tendency; that is, in virtue of this state of affairs
the world at t1 had a bias towards carrying on in
a way that included the paralysis of the respiratory
system at t2. This tendency was realized; there
were no countervailing tendencies to stand in the
way of its realization. Thus, the world carried on
in accordance with the tendency, so that paralysis
of the respiratory system, and hence the death of
the patient, occurred. In this sense, the presence of
morphia in the blood caused the patient’s death.
Causation, on this account, always consists in a
causal process: if A caused B, then A and B were
stages of the same causal process. By a process,
I mean a continuous series of states of affairs. By
a causal process, I mean a process each stage of
which is the result of a tendency whose basis was
an earlier stage of the process.
Applications in ontological engineering
Our hypothesis at IFOMIS is that metaphysical the-
ories of causality, space, time, material substance,
body, organism, environment, spatial and tempo-
ral continuity, and so forth, can provide a common
domain-neutral framework for the development of
a series of domain-speciﬁc theories for ontological
engineering [4,5]. In our present case this means
that knowledge about the nature of causal connex-
ions can help provide a framework for the formal
representation of information about causings. Let
me give four illustrations of the implications of
this remark:
• First, the tendency theory entails something
about what causes and effects are and how they
are to be described. This tells us how we should
represent causes and effects. The theory says
that a tendency is ‘based on a state of affairs’.
This means that specifying a cause requires the
speciﬁcation of thing, aspect and time. Both
thing and aspect may be referred to by different
information systems in different ways, e.g. by
using a name for the spatial location of the
thing or by using a name of the thing itself (e.g.
‘Jones’s liver’). Formal means have to be found
for unifying such different types of reports.
• Second, the tendency theory helps us to under-
stand causation by absence (as in, ‘The lack of
insulin caused the hyperglycaemia’) and causa-
tion by defect (as in, ‘The genetic defect caused
the Down’s syndrome’). In both cases there is
a tendency whose basis is referred to indirectly.
The basis of the tendency towards the hyper-
glycaemia was not some ‘lack’, but rather some
positive state of affairs involving a certain con-
centration of insulin at a certain time and place.
Similarly, the basis of the tendency towards the
Down’s syndrome was not caused by a thing
that is a defect, but rather by a positive state of
affairs, namely by the presence of three No. 21
chromosomes.
• Third, the tendency theory entails that a tendency
will be realized unless it is prevented from doing
so. This gives us a clue to dealing with informa-
tion about something having been prevented or
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preventable in given circumstances. Most the-
ories of causation assume that the occurrence
of a complete cause is a sufﬁcient condition for
the occurrence of its effect. Then, however, the
description of a cause becomes very lengthy,
since it must refer to all things that could have
prevented the effect in such a way that their
non-occurrence is registered as part of the cause.
From the perspective of the tendency theory, in
contrast, no event is sufﬁcient for the occur-
rence of a certain later event. For the theory
distinguishes between a cause and possible ways
in which, even in the presence of the complete
cause, the effect could have been prevented. This
allows more adequate and more efﬁcient repre-
sentation of causal information.
• Finally, the tendency theory may give us clues
about reasoning with regard to causal informa-
tion. Statistical information is to be used as
evidence for there being certain tendencies in
certain situations. In this way, we can acquire
knowledge of the kind, ‘If a patient is in state
S then there is a tendency towards him having
disease D (e.g. lung cancer)’. This means that,
given he is in this state, he will get disease D
unless something prevents that. The conjunction
of ‘Patient P is in state S’ and ‘Patient P did not
develop D’ entails that something prevented D.
Further knowledge can be acquired about what
prevents it being the case that a patient in state
S develops D. Regularity theories do not allow
this kind of reasoning because they do not dis-
tinguish statistical knowledge from knowledge
about tendencies.
The main reason for being optimistic that, with the
tendency theory, we will be able to make progress
with regard to representing and reasoning with
causal information is that it seems to overcome
the difﬁculties that the regularity theories face. The
objections raised in the literature suggest that regu-
larity theories lead to false conclusions about what
caused what, and they operate with generalizations
that are unreliable. If we process information on
the basis of an inadequate philosophical theory of
causation, we should not be surprised if we get
in trouble. With the tendency theory we should be
more successful.
Since issues of fusion of terminologies, pre-
vention, causation by absence and reasoning with
regard to causal information are precisely among
the most serious challenges facing current medi-
cal ontology [3], the tendency theory promises to
be of interest not only to philosophers but also to
those involved in the practical business of medical
informatics.
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